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ABSTRACT
This article explores a potential socialization effect of unions on member preferences in wage out-
comes and bargaining structures. This challenges notions of union wage policies simply reflecting 
the material self-interest of their constituency. In their formative role, unions can either propagate 
more redistribution in society, that is, increasing equality, or increasing societal inequalities, arguing 
instead for equity. However, equity could be measured either individually or collectively, where the 
latter would mean increasing societal wage inequalities while favouring intra-union equality. By 
putting perspectives on worker preferences and political economic theories in dialogue with the 
literature on the role of unions in constructing notions of equality/equity, we discuss on union strat-
egy as it relates to their socialization effects and members’ attitudes towards income inequality 
and bargaining structures. Analysing survey data, we find that socioeconomic status has greater 
influence on preferred wage outcomes, while union membership has more influence over bargain-
ing structure. 
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Introduction
Despite income redistribution being a normative ideal in European welfare societies, preferences when it comes to wage outcomes and bargaining structures have been largely neglected in the research literature, being only to a limited extent explored as 
cross-national variations (Osberg & Smeeding 2006; Checchi et al. 2010; Arndt 2018). 
Furthermore, research on attitudes towards wage setting and inequality has been overtly 
focused on structuralist explanations of social class position (Scheuer 1986; Ritzman & 
Tomaskovic-Devey 1992; Barth et al. 2003; Checchi et al. 2010; Pernicka & Lücking 
2012). The role of unions in shaping the perception of interests and attitudes among 
members has thus been largely ignored, with Arndt (2018), Kim and Margalit (2017) 
and Mosimann and Pontusson (2017) being notable exceptions. 
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Kim and Margalit (2017) argue that unions have a formative role on their member-
ship in their role as information providers. In a similar vein, the contributions of Arndt 
(2018) and Mosimann and Pontusson (2017) point out that the preferences among 
union members of the same socioeconomic background varies with union profile. 
According to Mosimann and Pontusson (2017), the preference for redistribution is 
stronger among members that belong to unions that display a combination of high den-
sity and organising in more or less equal measure low- and high-wage workers, and that 
this is particularly true among the high-wage earners. Arndt (2018), on the other hand, 
discloses that this only holds when the higher earners are members of blue-collar unions, 
as members of white-collar unions tend to be more oriented towards market allocation 
of income. Hence, this research indicate that union members are not homogeneous, not 
even within the same social class, and that union profile matters across the wage distri-
bution, as well as within high- and low-wage strata. 
Our analysis focuses on precisely such a formative effect of different union con-
federations when it comes to constructing solidarity across and within educational and 
income groups. The main contribution of this article is to demonstrate the likelihood 
of a socialization effect of unions on member preferences by exploring the explanatory 
power of union membership alongside that of social class by distinguishing the influence 
of social economic status from that of union membership when it comes to preferences 
in wage outcomes and bargaining structures. Our research question is: to what extent 
are preferences of wage outcomes and bargaining structure shaped by union member-
ship? To answer this, we will investigate individual support for wage compression and 
for (de)centralised bargaining based on survey data consisting of a representative sample 
of Norwegian workers in the period 2015–2019. 
In our view, Norway is a particularly interesting case for such a venture. The union 
movement in Norway is, along with the other Nordic countries, among the most class-
segmented in the world (Kjellberg 2000; Arndt 2018). Occupational class interests and 
union strategy may thus be more strongly associated here. Furthermore, highly educated 
workers in Norway would be free to choose between affiliation to four different union 
confederations, which differ quite substantially on the question of income inequalities 
and bargaining structures. Recent union growth has largely occurred in professional 
associations seeking to achieve and maintain privilege and traditional closure strategies 
in collective bargaining (Wallerstein & Golden 1997; Campbell & Haiven 2011; Arndt 
2018). This might lead to diverging interests in the union movement (Scheuer 1993; 
Barth et al. 2003; Arndt 2018). Lately, Norwegian professional associations have started 
to question the fairness of compressed wage structures, drawing on discourses of equity 
and ‘fair share (Fennefoss et al. 2000: Fennefoss & Høgsnes 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008). 
As such, the Norwegian context will, to a larger extent than its Nordic neighbours, 
provide fertile grounds to observe whether the political stance of unions is reflected in 
members’ attitudes.
The article builds on the emerging research on different union interests (Arndt 
2018; Kim & Margalit 2017). Our data are of excellent quality. It contains informa-
tion about which federation to which union members belong, education level and wage 
income. With our data, we can observe differences between individuals within the same 
socioeconomic strata according to membership of union confederations. Moreover, 
the data contain information about gender and age, sector, industrial sector, part-time 
employment, management position and political voting behaviour. The latter allows us 
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to exhaust most of the competing explanations of attitude formation, for example ‘right-
wing’ alliances. With these data, we can do robust analyses of variation in attitudes 
and preferences among employees according to union confederation. We cannot dis-
entangle the endogeneity present in union membership and the influence of unions on 
peoples’ political opinions with cross-sectional data, but this is a minor concern given 
our aim first and foremost being to demonstrate the plausibility of a union socialization 
 mechanism.
Social class as a predictor of attitudes towards redistribution 
Most of the literature on preferences for redistribution has, according to Pontusson 
(2013), a distinctly individualist orientation, meaning that it largely analyses indi-
vidual preferences as these derive from material self-interest, for example will the 
individual worker gain or lose from redistribution? In this view, individual prefer-
ences for redistribution will solely depend on their social class position and exposure 
to risk, which is determined by their income level, skill composition, occupation and 
employment relations (Iversen & Soskice 2001; Alt & Iversen 2017). Hence, the pref-
erence and support for redistribution policies, including the wage policies of unions, 
will be inversely related to income and employment security. This is because strictly 
self- interested individuals would not rationally be willing to shoulder the costs of con-
tributing to any ‘public good’ derived from unionization (Pernicka & Glassner 2014). 
Workers finding themselves at the upper end of the labour market, with job security 
deriving from skills and with high wages would presumably be least willing to do so. 
Moreover, these workers would not view collective organization as optimal in wage 
negotiations, standing to gain more from making individual wage claims (Mosimann 
& Pontusson 2017; Arndt 2018). 
Presuppositions about the primacy of economic returns have given rise to theo-
retical contributions seeking to understand unions as the aggregate of each individual 
member’s perceived material self-interest, or alternatively, that unions portray them-
selves as catering for these perceived self-interests to attract members. Analyses of this 
kind often seek to identify separate ‘union profiles’ based on the socioeconomic back-
ground of their (potential) members. In this strand of thought it is regarded as one of the 
main tasks of unions to preserve and improve the current wage level of their members, 
even to the disadvantage of other unionized workers (Elster 1989: 121). In Scheuer’s 
(1986) framework this means that highly educated workers would form professional-
oriented unions seeking to increase the status for their constituency to the detriment of 
strategies aimed at equalisation. It follows that unions representing low-skilled workers 
will be more solidaristic and bent on equalisation of wages, compared to white-collar 
unions representing high-skilled workers (Arndt 2018). Studies based on European data 
to some extent corroborate this. According to Becher and Pontusson (2011), employ-
ment conditions and skills give rise to divergent preferences, and relative income is a 
significant predictor of attitudes towards redistribution polities. Professionals and asso-
ciate professionals hold negative attitudes towards governmental income redistribution, 
while skilled and unskilled workers are in favour of such policies (Svallfors 1993, 1997; 
Kitschelt & Rehm 2014; Arndt 2018). Interestingly, such class differences are most 
prominent in Scandinavia (Svallfors 1993, 1997). 
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However, the notion that union policy solely emerge from members’ interest has 
several caveats. First of all, it presupposes that workers organise either because they 
(a) hold egalitarian opinions and select a union representing their opinions, and/or (b) 
they are not overtly concerned by the effects of egalitarian policies on their own mate-
rial interests, and that this situation is static and not subject to change. As recognized 
by Alesina and Giuliano (2009), economic theories tend to presume that individuals 
have preferences defined over their lifetime. This leads them to emphasise the role of 
historical experiences, cultural factors and personal history when studying individual 
preferences for equality. Secondly, there is the issue of interest aggregation and homo-
geneity among union members. According to Pontusson (2013), much of the literature 
on preferences regarding redistribution does not deal properly with unions at all, and 
even less with how individual members’ preferences are aggregated. Although leaving a 
thorough examination of the mechanisms of preference aggregation for future research, 
Becher and Pontusson (2011) are critical of the assumption that the union constituency 
is by and large homogeneous, sharing a common perception of material and political 
interests. 
If we were to assume that unions simply aggregate the policy preferences of a homo-
geneous constituency, for instance through majority rule, Becher and Pontusson (2011) 
find it reasonable to presume that the location of union members along the income 
distribution would affect the extent to which their policies endorse redistribution. This 
would also mean that different unions within the same country would organise workers 
with more or less the same attitudes towards income redistribution, and thus that the 
unions would devise more or less redistributive policies depending on what segments of 
the income distribution they organise. 
However, Becher and Pontusson (2011) do not find evidence to support this when 
comparing craft/occupational and industrial unions across national contexts, including 
when considering the Nordic countries in which there are separate white-collar and 
blue-collar unions, and, as in Norway, even competition between them for the same 
(potential) members. Based on their findings, Becher and Pontusson (2011) propose 
that one interpretation of this is that unions promote solidarity among their members, 
even though their immediate material interests would not necessarily lead them to sup-
port such notions. This leads us to studies of the formative role of unions, and the 
effects of union membership on members’ preferences in wage outcomes and bargaining 
 structures.
The union factor: How unions’ influence preferences for 
redistribution and collective action
The objective in this article is to investigate whether unions have an independent effect 
on attitudes above and beyond socioeconomic status (SES). Recent research substanti-
ates that union strategy influence members’ preferences. As pointed out by Pontusson 
(2013:798), even though all union members are more supportive of egalitarianism and 
redistribution than non-union workers, this is even more so among members with high 
(household) incomes. 
In Kim and Margalit’s (2017) study of the influence unions exert on the attitudes of 
their members, they make a compelling case for a socialization effect since self-selection 
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into union membership only accounts for at most a quarter of the observed union effect. 
This leads Kim and Margalit (2017) to conclude that unions are not merely the aggre-
gate voice of workers’ individual self-interest, but rather that unions do influence the 
views of their membership in a meaningful way. Similarly, Pontusson (2013) draw on the 
so-called ‘power resources theory’ (PRT), assigning as it does a key explanatory role to 
unions. With this as a point of departure, Pontusson (2013) argues that his own compel-
ling evidence against basing any explanations of an association between union member-
ship and support for redistribution solely on self-selection, suggests that self-selection 
and union effects should not be regarded as mutually exclusive. 
One way of assigning explanatory power to unions, is to, by means of organisa-
tional-political analyses, turn our attention to the larger project of building union iden-
tities (Fennefoss 1996). Such analyses are built upon the presupposition that the notion 
that classes exist objectively in themselves underestimates, or even neglects, the pro-
found influence unions have in forming and shaping social classes and attitudes. Focus-
ing instead on the subjective dimension of classes for themselves means that the very 
activities of groups, such as unions, serve to change them substantively and substantially 
(Castree et al. 2004). Discourses of fairness are both constructed and drawn upon by 
unions, shaping the frame of reference and the experiences of workers (Jones 1983). The 
distinction between class in itself and for itself furthermore reminds us that the con-
sciousness of classes is not a constant but a variable. Any antagonisms between social 
classes on the question of wage distribution result from the construction of solidarity 
and the constitution of the class for itself. Attitudes of union members are conditioned 
by ongoing struggles over classifications and negotiations over identities in the union 
movement. 
As argued by Alesina and Giuliano (2009), individuals’ attitudes regarding redistri-
bution and acceptable levels of social inequality are intertwined with political ideology 
and notions of what is (un)fair. Checchi et al. (2010) thus argue that union membership 
cannot be regarded as solely the result of a rational choice based on instrumental con-
siderations related to relative earnings. In their view, union membership is also the result 
of unions expounding a philosophy of egalitarianism and basing their actions on claims 
toward contributing to more fairness in the labour market. 
There are, however, two competing norms fairness in the union movement; equali-
sation and equity, both of which are legitimate claims in wage negotiations with quite 
 different impacts on wage distribution. Equalisation entails reduction of inequality, pri-
oritising low-wage earners in negotiations. Equity, on the other hand, entails remunera-
tion bend on endowment or effort, potentially resulting in increased wage inequality 
based, for instance, on different levels of productivity (Høgsnes 1989: 345). To the extent 
that unions’ profiles affect members’ preferences, we expect to find a stronger support 
for redistribution and collective wage bargaining among union members in unions with 
a clear equalisation profile in contrast to members of white-collar unions (Mosimann & 
Pontusson 2017; Arndt 2018). 
Because we use survey data in our inquiries, we cannot rule out reversed causality, 
that is that workers choose unions that mirror their political views and preferences for 
redistribution. The theoretical arguments, and previous research findings, however, pro-
vide sufficient support to suggest the plausibility of a union effect. Our analytical strat-
egy, described in the method section, exhausts alternative explanations to the association 
between attitudes and confederations with a wide control of confounding variables. 
6 Social Class, Union Strategies, and Preference Ann Cecilie Bergene and Ida Drange
The Norwegian context
The Norwegian union movement is a good example of how the triple tension pointed 
out by Hyman (2001) between market, society and class has given rise to a variety of 
ideological orientations and union identities. Particularly the last 40 years, there has 
been an emergence of new, occupation-specific union confederations.  
There is at present four union confederations in Norway, organising both along the 
blue-/white-collar divide and within the group of white-collar workers. The four con-
federations differ in terms of their historical legacy and their orientation to the Labour 
Party. They are also different when it comes to level of centralization, union strategies 
and their size, as well as the industries their affiliates organise and the occupational 
character of their individual members (Bergene & Mamelund 2015). The organisations 
are LO (Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions), 
YS (Yrkesorganisasjonenes Sentralforbund, The Confederation of Vocational Unions), 
Unio (Confederation of Unions for Professionals) and Akademikerne (The Federation 
of Norwegian Professional Associations). While LO and YS mainly organise blue-collar 
workers and vocational occupations, Unio and Akademikerne organise only profes-




LO Primarily vocational occupations 1899 800,000
YS Primarily vocational occupations 1977 220,000
Akademikerne (former AF) Professional occupations 1997 170,000
Unio Professional occupations 2001 320,000
Table 2 shows the distribution of each educational group across the confederations. As 
we can see, only LO feature an even distribution of members across all education levels, 
while the majority of YS members have basic, vocational or lower tertiary education. 
Unio primarily represent members with tertiary education and Akademikerne represent 
members with higher tertiary education. The elite professions, for example medical doc-
tors, lawyers and economist, are organised in Akademikerne, while the welfare-state 
professionals are organised in Unio.    
Table 2   Education level across confederations (waves: 2014–2019). Numbers in percent,  
N = 11,696








Basic education 29 28 1 0 9 9 31
Vocational education 37 31 2 1 19 14 25
Bachelor 24 30 48 16 52 47 31
Master 10 11 49 82 19 301 13
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
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Survey data from 1989 and 1993 show members of LO being more in favour of equaliza-
tion compared to YS and the former Akademikernes Fellesorganisasjon (AF) ( Academic 
and Professional Unions), while members of AF displayed preferences for more inequality 
and equity in wage determination (Høgsnes 1999: 63). AF was disbanded in 1997 and is 
the predecessor of both Akademikerne and Unio as its affiliates went separate ways out 
of disagreements regarding bargaining structures. This meant that some of the former 
affiliates of Akademikernes Fellesorganisasjon (AF), among them the unions for teach-
ers, nurses and police officers, and at a later stage the scientists and researchers, were not 
willing to join Akademikerne out of opposition to their strategy of local negotiations. For 
the former AF unions, joining LO was not an option due to its narrow blue-collar defini-
tion of worker and their affiliation to the Labour Party (Messel 2010), and instead they 
formed Unio in 2001. Today Unio and Akademikerne still fundamentally disagree on the 
question of central local versus local bargaining respectively. This became apparent in 
the 2014 and 2016 negotiations, when Akademikerne stated explicitly that they were in 
favour of decentralizing wage bargaining to the local or even individual level (Fennefoss 
and Høgsnes 2008), and signed their own collective agreement. They did so drawing on 
discourses of equity,1 arguing in favour of differentiating ‘on the basis of education, quali-
fications/skills, knowledge, effort and responsibility’. Akademikerne also take a norma-
tive stance in the direction of greater acceptance of societal differentiation.  
To a greater extent than Akademikerne, Unio try to balance market and social 
interests, and thus draw both on discourses of equity and a broader notion of societal 
solidarity and equality. As stated on their website, Unio ‘actively participates in labour 
policy, with a broad societal engagement’, prioritising ‘an incomes policy where both 
blue- and white-collar workers are included’ and ‘collective, central agreements acting 
as a necessary framework for local adjustments’ (our translation). At the same time, as 
we can see, they do acknowledge the need for local adjustments, and it seems fairness is 
defined as ‘[w]ork of equal value should be paid equally’, meaning ‘better wages based 
on education and skill’. We can thus discern references to both discourses of equity and 
of societal solidarity and equality.  
LO has been a central player in the development of the Norwegian welfare society 
and the tripartite model of industrial relations, being signatory to the first Basic Agree-
ment in 1935. As such, it has a strong commitment to ‘societal solidarity’ as opposed to 
‘class solidarity’, entailing an active involvement in wage moderation through coordi-
nated collective bargaining, the so-called frontfagsmodellen [the leading sector model] 
(Hernes 2006). Frontfagsmodellen ensures that the collective bargaining results in indus-
trial sectors exposed to international competition set the standards for other to follow, 
thus compressing the wage structure in Norway. LO explicitly draw on a discourse of 
equalisation, also stating explicitly that collective agreements should be centralised and 
nation-wide. 
YS was established in 1977, and was meant as a politically independent alternative 
to LO. Furthermore, compared to LO, YS has historically had a larger proportion of 
clerical workers, including workers with higher education, though not many profes-
sionals (cf. Tables 2 and 4 that show more YS members with lower tertiary education).  
Despite our results (Table 4) show rather small differences in composition between 
LO and YS, YS is more sectorally organised, with YS Public sector and YS Private sec-
tor as strong internal sections. Referring to this, a YS union official claimed in personal 
communication that, as a result, YS has a more heterogeneous constituency than the 
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other union confederations. Regardless of the truth-content of this statement, such self-
perception may partly explain why YS has the least clear policy of the four. When asked 
about their wage policy, the informant replied that ‘YS has probably not composed a 
short and unambiguous policy’. Our informant expressed that YS is ‘not happy about’ 
the observed increasing wage inequalities in Norway, while at the same time stressing 
that ‘this does not mean that [YS] is against there being wage differentials, only that they 
are becoming too great’ (personal communication). When trying to reflect on what ‘too 
great’ means, the informant drew neither on the principle of equity nor equality, only 
the sheer quantitative gap, meaning that the question could not be answered: ‘I think it 
is next to impossible to say precisely how great the wage differences in society should 
be’. There are no clear formulations in their official wage policy as to why there should 
be wage differentials, the closest being the argument that all workers should be ensured 
a good wage development and their fair share of wealth creation.2  
Research topic 
We analyse two variables relating to attitudes on wage inequality and bargaining prefer-
ence to investigate whether unions have an independent effect on these beyond that of 
SES. These questions are central to union strategies, as the confederations have stakes in 
(re)establishing bargaining structures and in compressing or increasing the wage differ-
entials which have dominated the negotiations since year 2000. The influence of unions 
on the attitudes and preferences of their members will probably apply to the greatest 
extent in questions where unions take a clear stance and engage in public discourse. 
Moreover, wage negotiations are of direct interest to workers, and are likely to inform 
their choice of union membership. We may therefore assume that members are, in gen-
eral terms, familiar with the policies of the confederation to which they belong, and 
especially so during a period in which the confederations explicitly differ in their strate-
gies with material outcomes. 
The first variable is based on a question pertaining to whether wage inequalities 
in Norway ought to be smaller, stay the same or increase. Considering the dominant 
position of LO in the Norwegian politico-economic context, and the general support 
of equalisation and wage moderation, we would expect members of Akademikerne and 
Unio to show a stronger preference for increased wage differentials, also after adjusting 
for SES (H1). This because Akademikerne and Unio have advocated the allocation of a 
higher share of generated surplus to higher educated workers on the basis of notions of 
equity (Fennefoss & Høgsnes 2008).
The second variable measures workers’ bargaining preferences. Centralised wage 
agreements (CWA) are vital for restraining increasing wage inequalities. Considering 
that the low-skilled and skilled workers so far have benefited more from CWAs com-
pared to the high-skilled, we posit that the low-skilled and skilled workers are more 
likely to display a preference for centrally negotiated agreements. Due to a stronger 
bargaining position vis-à-vis employers from which to make wage claims, (Silver 2003) 
we would expect highly skilled workers to prefer local wage setting, negotiated either 
individually or by union representatives As we have seen, the union confederations have 
diverging policies on bargaining structure. If we observe diverging preferences within 
similar SES-groups, we consider this a union effect (H2). 
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Data 
The survey data consist of seven waves of the YS Employee Working Conditions Surveys, 
covering the years 2014–2019. The YS EWCS is an annual cross-sectional survey of a 
nationally representative sample of the working population aged 18–68 years. The inclusion 
criterion is that respondents work a minimum of two days a week (i.e., a 40% position).
TNS Gallup gathers the data according to a stratified sampling procedure. There 
is an underrepresentation of young men with low education in the sample, due both 
to recruitment and non-response biases (see Bergene & Mamelund (2015) for more 
information on data gathering and sampling procedures). Union members are overrep-
resented in the net sample, and the share of union members varies between 64% and 
68% in the seven waves of this study. This is approximately ten percentage points higher 
than the corresponding figure for the population. Moreover, members of LO and YS 
are overrepresented, while Unio and Akademikerne are underrepresented. The sampling 
weight adjust for sampling bias according to age, education and gender. We analysed 
the data with and without sampling weights. Weighting the sample did not change the 
direction or significance of our main results. Sampling weights are superfluous once the 
multivariate analyses include gender, age and education. Furthermore, the purpose of 
the descriptive statistics is to describe sample characteristics – and not population char-
acteristics. For this reason, sample weights were not employed in the descriptive tables 
nor in the regression analyses. 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variables cover aspects of wage formation and attitudes towards equal-
ization and collectivism. We analyse responses to two statements. 
The first statement was ‘In your opinion, should the wage differences in society 
become greater, smaller or stay at the current level?’ The response alternatives were 
‘smaller’, ‘as is’, ‘greater’ and ‘do not know’. 
The second statement included a preamble explaining the motivation for wage bar-
gaining at central, local and individual level, respectively. The statement read: ‘Wage 
negotiations take place at different levels. National (central) negotiations between the 
social partners take the state of the country’s economy into account and/or seek to avoid 
creation of large wage differences; negotiations at the company level will, for exam-
ple, consider the business finances, whereas individual negotiations will consider each 
employee’s qualifications and performance. In your view, should wage bargaining take 
place between’: 1) Unions and employer associations at a national level (centralised), 
2) Union representatives and employers at company level (local), 3) the employee and 
the employer (individualised) and 4) Do not know. See Table 3 for descriptive statistics 
on the dependent variables. 
Independent variables 
The main independent variables are union confederation membership, education level 
and wage incomes. The variable union confederation membership is a nominal category 
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variable identifying members of affiliates of LO, YS, Unio and Akademikerne, members 
of independent unions, unorganised workers and a remainder category consisting of 
people who do not know which confederation they belong to.3 The education level and 
wage income variables are combined into a SES index that measure workers’ socio- 
economic position. The rationale is that education and income combined better capture 
the different dispositions of workers in similar occupational positions, than education 
and income averaged over the sample. Table 3 displays the categorization of the SES 
measure and Table 4 displays the confederations’ profile across SES-groups. 
Table 3 The classification and distribution of SES (2014–2019). N = 11,696
Socio-economic status Education level Wage position Percent
(1) Unskilled workers, low wage Elementary and High school 1.–7. decile 17%
(2) Skilled workers, low wage Vocational education 1.–6. decile 15%
(3) Unskilled and skilled workers, high wage Elementary and High school  8.–10. decile 13%
Vocational education 7.–10. decile
(4) Highly skilled workers, low wage Bachelor degree 1.–5. decile 21%
Master’s degree 1.–4. decile 
(5) Highly skilled workers, medium wage Bachelor’s degree 6.–9. decile 25%
Master’s degree  5.–8. decile
(6) Highly skilled workers, high wage Bachelor’s degree 10. decile 9%
Master’s degree 9.–10. decile
Table 4 The distribution of Union Confederation per SES (2014–2019). N = 11,696






25% 24% – – 4% 7% 23%
(2)  Skilled workers, 
low wage
















2% 4% 5% 35% 14% 8% 10%
Total number of 
observations
3444  1179 1404  1030 516  492 3631
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We have experimented with different cut-offs for wage, and the results are highly robust 
to specification. In appendix A, an analysis displays the results for a regression with 
separate measures of wage income and education level. 
Control variables
The control variables are age and age squared, gender, industrial sector, public/pri-
vate sector, part-time employment, supervisory/management position, current wage-
setting arrangement and party-political preference. These variables are likely to 
confound the relationship between SES, union confederation membership and prefer-
ences with regard to wage inequalities and wage setting. Table 5 displays the descrip-
tive statistics.
Table 5  Descriptive statistics (waves: 2014–2019). N = 11,696
Women 52% Political party affiliation
Public sector 47%   Labour party (AP) 27%
Business/industry   Progress party (FrP) 10%
  Public admin., incl. services 14%   Conservative party (H) 23%
  Education  14%   Pol. centre parties (V, SP, KrF) 13%
  Health and social service 15%   Socialist left party (SV) 6%
  Industry 25%  Other 4%
  Trade and services 21%   No answer  17%
  Creative and academic occ. 6% Wage agreement
 Other 4%   Collective wage agreement 70%
Part-time 12%   Individual wage settlement  30%
Manager 27% Mean age: 46.7 years  
Regression methods and analytical strategy
Both of the dependent variables in our analyses are nominal-level variables with two 
or more categories. We therefore apply multinomial logistic regression. All models have 
been tested for violations of the regression assumptions.
Logistic regressions investigate how the likelihood of one outcome, on a dichoto-
mous variable, increases or decreases with group-level characteristics. The multino-
mial logistic analyses extend the logistic model to several outcomes. The model com-
pares the effects of the independent variables on the likelihood for any given outcome 
with a base category, which gives the coefficients a relative interpretation. Because 
many people do not have a strong opinion on wage distribution and wage setting, we 
include those who answer, ‘I do not know’ in the analyses, but not in the presentation 
of results. Hence, presented likelihoods do not cumulate to one. We calculate predicted 
probability and marginal effects of union membership averaged over the other vari-
ables in the models. 
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Our analytical strategy is to first show differences according to union confed-
eration membership, we then add SES and the different control variables. This will 
illustrate how much SES and other controls explain the observed, bivariate effect 
of union confederation in model 1. If any differences remain between the confed-
erations after adjusting for SES, individual characteristics, political affiliation and 
occupational characteristics, we attribute this independent effect of confederations 
to union identity and a socialisation effect. More precisely, we consider our hypoth-
esis of the formative role of union policy strengthened if we are unable to explain 
the association between attitudes and confederations with plausible confounding 
variables.4 
Results 
Attitudes towards wage dispersion
The results from the first analysis appear in the first column of Table 6a. It shows that 
a majority of workers, independent of confederation membership, actually prefers 
a reduction in wage inequalities. A graphic display of these numbers is presented in 
 Figure 1a. 
Figure 1a  Preference for wage differences according to Union Confederation membership.
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The share is highest among LO members (70%), followed by Unio members (65%), 
YS (60%) and Akademikerne (41%). The second most frequent preference is for 
maintaining current levels of wage inequality. Here, the rank is reversed, with most 
support among members of Akademikerne (42%), followed by YS (32%), Unio 
(24%) and LO (23%). Lastly, those most in favour of increased wage differences 
are found among members of Akademikerne (10%), followed by Unio (5%). The 
members of YS and LO members to a lesser extent express this opinion, with only 
4%in both confederations. However, given the different composition of the member-
ships, we need to adjust for socio-economic position and other relevant background 
characteristics. 
Table 6a  Multinomial logistic regression. Preference for smaller and larger societal wage differences. 
‘As is’ is the reference category 
 Unadjusted Adjusted








Independent variables logit Se logit se logit se logit se
Union Confederation (ref: LO)
YS –0.471*** 0.076 –0.139 0.178 –0.296*** 0.083 –0.193 0.182
Unio –0.114 0.075 0.299 0.161 –0.172 0.093 0.318 0.186
Akademikerne –1.105*** 0.080 0.456** 0.145 –0.668*** 0.096 0.225 0.167
Independent –1.029*** 0.103 0.290 0.190 –0.505*** 0.115 0.195 0.201
Do not know –0.482*** 0.110 0.304 0.220 –0.310* 0.121 0.215 0.228
Not a member –0.977*** 0.054 0.257* 0.115 –0.513*** 0.067 0.143 0.133
Socio-economic status group (ref unskilled, low wage)
Skilled, low wage 0.034 0.082 0.185 0.172
Skilled and unskilled, high 
wage
–0.795*** 0.085 –0.043 0.163
Higher education, low wage –0.038 0.083 0.156 0.175
Higher education, medium 
wage
–0.568*** 0.079 0.199 0.157
Higher education, high wage  –1.183*** 0.104 0.598*** 0.169
Control variables Included
Constant 1.101*** 0.041 –1.854*** 0.096 1.921*** 0.395 –2.204** 0.748
–2LL –11535.5 –10485.2
Df 18 102
N 11696    11696    
p-levels (* 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001). Control variables in the adjusted model: gender, age, age squared, industrial sector, 
sector, part-time employment, management position, year and party political preference. 
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The second column of Table 6a presents the analyses with controls. This analysis shows 
a strong reduction of the differences between the confederations, although the general 
pattern remains. In line with our expectations, we find that confederations have an effect 
on the preferences for societal wage dispersion, after adjusting for SES and controls. 
The marginal effect, that is the change of likelihood associated with membership in 
YS, Unio, Akademikerne, independent confederations or for non-members relative to 
LO members, are substantial in magnitude (meaning that the marginal effect is equiva-
lent to the gap between bar-height in Figure 1, adjusted values). The likelihood that YS 
members and Unio members prefer a lower level of wage dispersion in society, adjusted 
for controls, is 6 percentage points lower relative to LO members. For members of Aka-
demikerne, the associated marginal effect is 17 percentage points. 
The results show that the majority of workers in general prefer smaller wage inequal-
ities, but this attitude is most widespread among members of LO, regardless of their 
position in the class schema. We list the percentage of workers who prefer a reduction 
in wage inequalities represented by confederation membership in descending order: LO 
(68%), YS (60%), Unio (60%) and Akademikerne (50%). Adjusting for socio- economic 
status does not alter the distribution with regard to preferring increased inequalities, 
except among members of Akademikerne. Adjusting for socio-economic status and con-
trols reduce the share in favour of increasing wage inequality among the latter, and 
thus bring members of Akademikerne more in line with the preferences of members of 
the other confederations. Hence, part of the difference observed in the first column of 
 Figure 1 is due to SES. People of high SES tend to be more in favour of a larger wage dis-
persion, and this bias the results towards preferring larger differences between members 
of confederations who organise lower SES and higher SES workers, respectively. Once we 
account for this difference, adjusting the analyses for SES and other confounding vari-
ables, the results display a convergence in preferences across membership status, but still 
we observe a substantial difference according to membership status that is not accounted 
for by SES or political preferences, as well as the other control variables. 
The results in column 2 (Table 6a) and the predicted results in Figure 1a are averages 
across socio-economic status. Because the lower SES groups dominate the membership 
constituency of LO, and the higher SES groups dominate the constituency of Akademik-
erne, adjusted average effects can conceal differences in preferences among LO members 
according to SES. We have performed analyses of the membership in the four union con-
federations within SES groups, and the results are displayed in figure 1b (see Table 6b). 
Because Unio and Akademikerne primarily organise members with higher education (cf. 
Tables 1 and 2), we include these confederations only in the SES-groups with higher 
education. We concentrate our discussion of preferences around ‘smaller differences’, 
because the significant differences between confederations are primarily found between 
those who answer ‘smaller differences’ and ‘as is’, and hence the results are inverse. 
First, LO members in the unskilled and skilled low-wage groups are most in favour 
of smaller differences, whereas YS members in the skilled and unskilled high wage-group 
are most in favour of smaller differences. Non-members show the lowest preference for 
reduced differences. 
In the higher education groups, LO members are most in favour of smaller differ-
ences, whereas members of Akademikerne show least preference for ‘smaller differences’ 
in the low- and medium-wage groups. However, in the high-wage group, members of 
LO display the highest preference for wage compression, whereas Akademikerne, Unio 
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Figure 1b  Preference for wage differences within SES-categories according to Union Confederation 
membership.
members, YS members and non-members show least preference for smaller differences. 
One possible explanation for this finding is that managers are overrepresented in the 
highest earner group among Unio members. 
Figure 1b also displays a clear wage and education gradient in preferences for soci-
etal wage inequalities. First, the lower the wage, the stronger the preference for redis-
tribution, regardless of education level. Second, those with higher education display 
weaker preferences for smaller wage differences and a stronger preference for larger 
wage differences compared with unskilled and skilled workers in the high wage group. 
The differences between members of the four confederations are significant with 
regard to the preference for decreasing wage dispersal relative to maintaining the current 
level of wage dispersal in society. However, there are no significant differences between 
confederation memberships with regard to the preference for larger wage dispersal, rela-
tive to maintaining the current level (see Table 6a). 
Preferred bargaining structures
The final investigation is bargaining preferences, and it directly addresses the core con-
flict between the different confederations in the 2014 and 2016 negotiations. The results 
appear in Table 7a and in Figure 2. 
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Table 7a  Preference for level of wage negotiation. Local level is reference category. 
 Unadjusted Adjusted
 Central Individual Central Individual
Independent variables logit se logit se logit se logit se
Union Confederation (ref: LO)
YS –0.517*** 0.078 0.144 0.128 –0.558*** 0.083 –0.003 0.130
Unio 1.067*** 0.098 0.365* 0.171 0.327** 0.113 0.074 0.184
Akademikerne –1.204*** 0.082 0.313** 0.116 –1.098*** 0.098 0.061 0.129
Independent –1.454*** 0.111 0.214 0.145 –1.119*** 0.118 0.227 0.150
Do not know –0.458*** 0.115 0.458** 0.169 –0.587*** 0.125 0.360* 0.174
Not a member –1.104*** 0.062 1.496*** 0.086 –0.865*** 0.068 1.364*** 0.091
Socio-economic status group (ref unskilled, low wage)
Skilled, low wage 0.024 0.085 0.112 0.109
Skilled and unskilled, high 
wage
–0.260** 0.090 0.147 0.108
Higher education, low wage 0.043 0.087 –0.200 0.113
Higher education, medium 
wage
–0.278*** 0.084 0.114 0.101
Higher education, high wage  –0.464*** 0.112 0.317** 0.120
Control variables 
Constant 1.003*** 0.042 –1.227*** 0.075 0.786 0.419 –1.341** 0.514
–2LL –13047 –12390
df 18 69
N 11696    11696    
p-levels (* 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001). Control variables: gender, age, age squared, industrial sector, sector, part-time employ-
ment, management position, year and party political preference. 
The analysis shows large and significant differences in the preference for central 
negotiations. The highest support for central negotiations is found among Unio mem-
bers (80%), followed by LO (62%), YS (50%) and Akademikerne (35%). Non-members 
are least in favour of central negotiations (25%). 
Approximately 23% and 31% of the members of LO and YS, respectively, prefer 
local negotiations, compared to 43% of Akademikerne. Only 10% of the members of 
Unio prefer local negotiations. 
Finally, only a minority of members in all union confederations prefer individual 
negotiations. The list, in descending order, reads Akademikerne 17%, YS 11%, LO 
7% and Unio 4%. The comparative figure among non-members is 35%. Undoubt-
edly, an adjustment for compositional effects between the unions will attenuate these 
differences. 
However, surprisingly, the differences remain significant and quite large, even 
after adjusting for socio-economic position, gender, industrial sector, managerial/
supervisor position and political preference/voting behaviour. Most support for 
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central negotiations is still found among members of Unio (80%), followed by LO 
(62%), YS (50%) and Akademikerne (38%). The only difference is that, holding SES 
constant, members of Akademikerne display a slightly increased preference for cen-
tral negotiations. 
Next, members of Akademikerne (40%) and YS (32%) are more inclined to prefer 
local negotiations compared to members of LO (23%) and Unio (11%). 
Finally, adjusting for controls have no impact on the preference for individual 
negotiations, except among members of Akademikerne, among whom we find a slight 
decrease from 17% to 13% in favour of individual negotiations. 
Figure 2b displays differences in preference according to union confederation mem-
bership within SES-groups (Table 7b). 
Figure 2b clearly shows that union members in the low education SES groups prefer 
central negotiations independent of to which union confederation they belong. More-
over, the high-wage group falls to the left of those with low wage, which indicates a 
lower preference for central negotiations among high earners. 
Among those with higher education, Unio members display a stronger preference 
for central negotiations than LO members, except among those with higher education 
and high wages. As mentioned previously, this may be explained by the relatively high 
percentage of managers in this group. Akademikerne and non-members show similar 
low preferences for central negotiations. 
 The analysis shows that there are small variations in preference for central nego-
tiations across the SES groups. All in all, education does not seem to matter much for 
Figure 2a  Preference for level of wage negotiation according to Union Confederation membership.
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the preferences, but we can observe a gradient for income, as the higher-earner groups 
among those with low and high education fall to the left of those with low income.
Discussion
The purpose of this article was to explore how social class position and union strategies 
shape individuals’ bargaining preferences and their attitudes towards wage inequalities. 
Our objective was to put structural explanations based on social class position into 
dialogue with more agency-oriented perspectives based on the formative role of union 
strategies. This led us to explore whether union strategies, at the level of union confed-
erations, can explain differences in attitudes towards wage dispersion and preferred 
bargaining structures. We found that union confederation membership has a direct 
association on such attitudes and preferences. The results show that the majority of 
workers prefer smaller wage dispersion, but also that this attitude is most widespread 
among members of LO and Unio, regardless of their socio-economic status. Members 
of Akademikerne tilt more towards larger wage dispersion. Adjusting for party-political 
preference further strengthens our findings, since this presumably have a large impact on 
ideological and normative questions, such as social inequalities. Our analysis suggests 
then, that above and beyond ideological orientations and position in the social class 
schema, unions are formative of their members’ attitudes. 
Figure 2b  Preference for level of wage negotiation within SES-categories according to Union Confederation 
membership.
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Unions might be formative in several ways. First, merely by having established a 
segmented union movement, unions include or exclude workers according to occupa-
tion, and workers will choose to belong to unions that reflect their (perceived) inter-
ests. This will presumably influence union identities and strategies, amongst others by 
majority rule. Secondly, making separate wage claims, this will also foster the seg-
mentation of the labour market, thus furthering the material inequalities between the 
groups. In other words, unions are, by way of their structure and identity-building 
project, involved in the social construction of occupational groups and their relative 
social and material privileges. As seen above, some would argue that union profiles 
are the outcome of selection processes, and that, as a corollary, the characteristics of 
their members shape union strategies. Our findings, on the other hand, suggest that the 
union confederations are involved in relative positioning through actively and strate-
gically producing what the workers select. Thirdly, and more importantly, unions are 
subsequently formative of their members through their communication and substantia-
tion of chosen strategies. We saw above that while Akademikerne draw explicitly on 
discourses of equity, and state a normative stance in the direction of greater societal 
acceptance for differentiation, LO, on the other hand, clearly state income equalisa-
tion as a main objective, emphasizing also societal redistribution. We argued that Unio 
draw on both discourses of equity, in statements such as ‘education should pay off’, and 
equalisation, through broader notions of societal solidarity, where the former is sub-
sumed by the latter. In our analysis of union strategies, we found YS the least explicit, 
and we argued that the organisation draws neither on the principle of equity nor equal-
ity, rendering income inequality a sheer quantitative measure, and hence the question 
of fairness impossible to answer.
The last research question investigated whether union confederation membership 
predicted bargaining preferences. Differences in preferred bargaining structures are 
striking, even after adjusting for party-political preference and socio-economic status, 
and substantially larger than the differences observed in attitudes towards wage dis-
persion. Our hypothesis is that the strategies of union confederations affect at what 
level members prefer wage setting. One reason why observed differences in preferred 
bargaining structures are larger than in attitudes towards wage dispersion may be 
that the latter is more tied up with hegemonic normative stances towards equality in 
social-democratic Norway, while the level of wage setting appears less political and 
value-laden.
Preferred bargaining structures has, however, been one of the most disputed topics 
in the Norwegian union movement recently, and the confederations pursue separate 
strategies (Fennefoss & Høgsnes 2008). We saw above that while Akademikerne make 
explicit reference to wage setting at the local and even individual level, Unio and LO 
favour centralised collective bargaining of nation-wide agreements. Our analysis shows 
that the majority of members in LO and Unio are in favour of such centralised bargain-
ing. Whereas the preferences among LO members show small shifts across wage seg-
ments, we observe marked change among Unio members in the low-, medium- and high 
wage sections. Unio members in the low- and medium wage sections are more positive 
to centralized wage bargaining than LO members, but this is reversed in the high-wage 
section. There are at least two possible explanations to this finding, and they are not 
mutually exclusive. First, close to the individual-oriented tradition of workers’ prefer-
ences and political economic theory, it could be that workers’ preferences are informed 
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purely by assessments of one’s own self-interest in collective organisation and central-
ised bargaining. In this regard, low and medium-wage earners in Unio would presum-
ably assume that their wage outcomes would be more favourable if they stick together 
bargaining against other highly educated groups. Similarly, and by extension, explaining 
the different preferences of Unio members in the low-, medium and high-wage sections 
might boil down to more relative considerations of fairness and thus reference points, 
that is with whom workers compare their wages and thus at what level of generality 
equality is defined and solidarity constructed. It could be argued that the members of 
Unio, who are largely highly educated and professionals, prefer central negotiations as 
a result of them being largely public sector workers. Thus, the mechanism suggested by 
Kitschelt and Rehm (2014) and Svallfors (1997), that occupational experience of inter-
acting with members of all social classes might foster egalitarian values, might explain 
their deviance. 
Secondly, as mentioned in out theoretical framework, professional unions, such 
as the affiliates of Unio, might seek to achieve and maintain privilege through closure 
strategies in collective bargaining (Wallerstein & Golden 1997; Campbell & Haiven 
2011; Arndt 2018). This would entail union strategies focussing on a high degree of 
intra-group equality and solidarity, arguably potentially to the detriment of inter-group 
solidarity, and as a result, preferences for increasing inter-group inequalities. However, 
based on Scheuer’s (1986) framework these workers should form professional-oriented 
unions seeking to increase the status for their constituency to the detriment of strategies 
aimed at equalisation. 
For Akademikerne, it seems that the framework developed by Scheuer (1986) has 
more explanatory power, especially when we take the dynamics of the 2014 and 2016 
central negotiations in the public sector into account. Since Akademikerne and Unio 
assumed opposite ends regarding local versus central negotiations, it becomes clear 
that we need to draw on more than one single perspective in our attempts at providing 
an explanation. As seen above, Akademikerne make explicit reference to wage setting 
at the local, and even individual, level in their strategies, while at the other end of 
the continuum, Unio and LO explicitly favour centralised and nation-wide collective 
agreements. On the part of Unio, this is to the extent that its affiliates established a 
new union confederation instead of joining Akademikerne on precisely this issue. Our 
analysis clearly shows that not many workers are in favour of individual wage nego-
tiations, not even in Akademikerne¸ although a larger share of their members actually 
does prefer this. 
Our study has two caveats. First, the lack of longitudinal data means that we 
cannot disentangle endogeneity of workers selecting into unions and the influence of 
union strategy on attitude and preference formation. Although our models include 
extensive controls of sources of attitude formation, including political party affiliation 
and industrial sector, there might be other sources of influence correlated with union 
membership that is not observed in our models. One example is occupational task 
structure, previously shown to affect attitude formation (Kitschelt and Rehm 2014).5 
Secondly, although the observed differences between the social classes and unions, 
the main picture is that most workers are against larger wage dispersal in society 
and union members do prefer collective to individualised bargaining. Nevertheless, 
our analysis confirms a strong correlation between union confederation and attitudes 
 Nordic journal of working life studies 23
towards the level of wage dispersion in society, and preference for centralised, local 
or individualised wage bargaining. In terms of support for the redistributive welfare 
state, these results highlight the importance of union strategy as a political force in 
society. 
Conclusion
Our point of departure was to explore two competing perspectives on bargaining pref-
erence and attitude formation when it comes to wage inequality. The first perspective 
suggests that social class position informs attitudes and preferences, whereas the second 
perspective is on the role of unions as political agents constructing, defining and shap-
ing the attitudes of their members on justice, solidarity and wage setting. Our results 
corroborate previous research in that SES continues to be highly correlated with such 
preferences and attitudes. However, and more interestingly, we also find that union con-
federation membership has a direct association with the same attitudes and preferences, 
after adjusting for social class, party-political preference and other control variables. 
This leads us to the conclusion that, above and beyond ideological orientation and SES, 
unions are formative of the members’ attitudes. 
We argued that unions are, by way of their structure and identity-building project, 
involved in the social construction of occupational groups and their relative social and 
material privilege. We saw that while Akademikerne draw explicitly on discourses of 
equity and assume a normative stance in the direction of greater societal acceptance for 
differentiation at one extreme, LO, at the other, clearly state equalisation and redistribu-
tion as major objectives. In between these two, Unio draw on both discourses, while YS 
draw on neither. Our analyses found that union confederation membership significantly 
predict attitudes and preferences, net of SES and other controls. These findings have 
important, positive, implications for the union movement. They largely point in the 
direction of unions not being structurally determined by their external context and a 
subsequent self-selected membership constituency, but are rather active in the construc-
tion and shaping of that context and their own constituency. This means that they have 
considerable leeway, which also increases the importance of reflecting upon the strate-
gies chosen. 
In addition to the important empirical findings, this article shows the merits of 
synthesizing competing perspectives and different data. This synthesising has broadened 
our understanding of preferred bargaining structures and attitudes to wage inequali-
ties and allowed us to study the social construction of notions of fairness, equality and 
equity, of which unions are part. We would thus argue that such synthesizing is necessary 
in order to gain a better understanding of attitudes and preferences, by including how 
union strategies shape these through contemporary and future strategies in the analyses. 
Furthermore, and maybe most importantly, these results highlight the importance of 
union strategy as a political force in society, especially in building support for the redis-
tributive welfare state. We would argue that these theoretical insights would hold for 
union movements in other contexts, particularly in the Nordic countries which share the 
long history of social-democratic hegemony and feature strong and highly visible union 
movements capable of making a material impacts and forming public opinion. On the 
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other hand, we would argue that our analytical model and empirical findings would not 
be as easily generalized, not even in a Nordic context. Despite unions playing a more 
prominent role in Nordic politics and economics than they do in most other countries, 
the structure and segmentation of the union movement varies considerably. Compared 
to the four union confederations in Norway, which to some extent have overlapping 
constituencies and thus compete for some of the same (potential) members, Denmark 
has only two main confederations, Sweden and Finland have three. In Sweden and Fin-
land there has, however, been attempts at cooperating and even merging, signaling that 
the confederations do not fundamentally differ on policies.
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Notes
1  [Please provide Note 1 text]
2  [Please provide Note 2 text]
3  These are individuals who are members of a trade union, but they do not know to which confederation 
their union belong, or they do not know if they belong to one at all. It is only 4% of the sample that 
answer ‘do not know’, but among these, 44% have higher education. One explanation might be that the 
professional associations’ confederations, Unio and Akademikerne, are younger federations compared 
with LO, and organize established professional associations such as the Norwegian medical association, 
the lawyer’s association, etc. 
4  As a robustness check, we also performed the analyses with 80 industry*education fixed-effects (> 50 
observations) to investigate whether we observe the same associations between attitudes and confedera-
tions among persons in similar occupational positions. The results are highly similar (see Appendix B).
5  The analyses in Appendix B, however, with industry*education controls did show similar results to the 
SES-models.
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Appendix A
Results with wage deciles and education levels. 
 Societal wage differences Level of wage negotiations
 Smaller Larger Central Individual
 logit se logit se logit se logit se
Wage deciles (1st decile)
2nd –0.061 0.117 –0.288 0.234 –0.107 0.119 0.276~ 0.162
3rd –0.288* 0.120 –0.631* 0.248 –0.033 0.126 0.479** 0.167
4th –0.540*** 0.115 –0.597** 0.231 –0.075 0.122 0.470** 0.163
5th –0.646*** 0.123 –0.912*** 0.250 –0.214 0.131 0.585*** 0.171
6th –0.868*** 0.123 –0.672** 0.239 –0.407** 0.131 0.355* 0.170
7th –0.901*** 0.121 –0.831*** 0.235 –0.348** 0.129 0.591*** 0.164
8th –1.102*** 0.120 –0.966*** 0.233 –0.483*** 0.128 0.525** 0.162
9th –1.354*** 0.128 –0.429~ 0.227 –0.486*** 0.136 0.694*** 0.168
10th –1.595*** 0.133 –0.532* 0.233 –0.399** 0.141 0.656*** 0.172
Education (unskilled)
Skilled worker –0.098 0.069 0.038 0.135 –0.016 0.073 0.011 0.090
Lower tertiary education –0.061 0.071 0.184 0.136 –0.097 0.077 –0.108 0.091
Higher tertiary education –0.032 0.087 0.708*** 0.155 –0.010 0.096 0.084 0.114
Union Confederation (LO)
YS –0.260** 0.084 –0.171 0.183 –0.441*** 0.084 –0.167 0.132
Unio –0.125 0.094 0.308 0.188 0.357** 0.114 –0.034 0.186
Akademikerne –0.683*** 0.100 0.074 0.174 –1.094*** 0.105 –0.151 0.139
Independent –0.465*** 0.115 0.205 0.201 –0.991*** 0.120 0.058 0.153
Do not know –0.281* 0.122 0.184 0.229 –0.454*** 0.127 0.145 0.177
Not member –0.512*** 0.068 0.130 0.133 –0.649*** 0.073 1.080*** 0.097
Constant 2.024*** 0.399 –2.128** 0.751 0.811~ 0.431 –2.022*** 0.534
–2LL –10430.9    –12031.7    
Df 123  123  
N 11696    11696    
p-levels (~ 0.10, * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001).
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Table B3   Multinomial logistic regression with industry*education fixed effects. Comparative to the 
adjusted effects in table 6a and 7a. 
 Societal wage difference Level of wage negotiation





 b se b se b se b se
YS –0.223* 0.087 –0.128 0.188 –0.440*** 0.089 –0.220 0.138
Unio –0.150 0.100 0.261 0.195 0.279* 0.119 0.091 0.193
Akademikerne –0.730*** 0.105 0.071 0.181 –1.059*** 0.110 –0.089 0.145
Independent –0.454*** 0.118 0.241 0.206 –0.993*** 0.124 0.027 0.157
Do not know –0.249* 0.125 0.194 0.233 –0.449*** 0.130 0.181 0.180
Not a member –0.520*** 0.069 0.137 0.136 –0.644*** 0.075 1.118*** 0.099
Control variables yes yes yes yes
Constant 2.104*** 0.437 –2.277* 0.890 0.885~ 0.471 –1.391* 0.590
–2LL –10284.369    –11819.961    
df 318.000    318.000    
N 11656    11656    
The control variables are age and age squared, gender, industrial sector, public/private sector, part-time employment, wage 
decile, supervisory/management position, current wage-setting arrangement and party-political preference. 
